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ABSTRACT
In “Of Personal Identity”, Hume attempts to understand why 
we ordinarily believe in persistent selves. He proposes that 
this ontological commitment depends on illusions and !c-
tions: the imagination tricks us into supposing that an 
unchanging core self remains static through the "ux and 
change of experience. Recent work in cognitive science pro-
vides a good deal of support for Hume’s hypothesis that 
common beliefs about the self are founded on psychological 
biases rather than rational insight or evidence. We naturally 
believe in personal persistence, according to this emerging 
research, because we are prone to categorize the world in 
terms of hidden essences and structure our lives in terms of 
whole life stories.
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In section 1.4.6 of the Treatise, Hume adopts an experimental approach to 
the study of personal identity.1 His main concern is to understand why it is 
so natural for human beings to believe in the continued existence of selves. 
We ordinarily suppose that we remain one and the same person over 
stretches of time. But what principles of human nature are responsible for 
this widespread belief? Is ontological commitment to persistent selves 
founded on reason or evidence? Or is it based on illusions and fictions of 
the imagination?
Hume o!ers a number of empirical claims about the psychological 
mechanisms that are responsible for common beliefs about personal persis-
tence. We must evaluate the status of these proposals, therefore, in light of 
our best available theories and evidence. How well does Hume’s experi-
mental account fare when evaluated from a cognitive science perspective? 
Does it teach us anything of lasting importance? Or is it merely of historical 
interest?
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This paper maintains that cognitive science research o!ers prima facie 
support for Hume’s explanation of everyday belief in persistent selves. Recent 
work on essential and narrative selves demonstrates that human beings have 
a natural tendency to suppose, contrary to the perpetual flux of experience, 
that they extend over time as immutable core selves or whole life stories. We 
are disposed to believe that there is greater coherence in our lives than we 
actually perceive, in other words, and that the successive moments of our 
personal past are united through narrative connections or hidden self-kernels.
Cognitive science research indicates that ontological commitment to 
persistent selves is based on universal propensities of the mind, although 
cultural factors influence whether individuals adopt essentialist or narrati-
vist strategies to accommodate change and maintain a sense of identity. The 
fact that everyday belief in personal persistence is based on general princi-
ples of human nature serves to explain, in turn, why this conviction is so 
resistant to philosophical reflection. Everyday belief in persistent selves 
cannot be dislodged by skeptical arguments because it is not founded on 
reason or evidence; rather, it is a natural belief as unavoidable and indis-
pensable to human beings as breathing.
1.1 Hume’s experimental approach to personal identity
Hume begins his investigations with a descriptive account of the content of 
our everyday beliefs about selves. We ordinarily think that we remain perfectly 
identical over time in the sense that we “continue invariably the same, thro’ 
the whole course of our lives” (T 1.4.6.2; SBN, p. 251). Let us capture this 
commitment in the following terms, with letters representing impressions.
(1) AAAAAAAAAAAAA
We do not only suppose that we continue to exist as numerically one and the 
same person over long stretches of time, on this proposal, but we also 
commonly believe that we remain qualitatively unchanged. We ordinarily 
imagine that there are unchanging cores to selves – some kind of pearls or 
kernels – that remain fixed and invariant over time.2
What we commonly believe about ourselves, however, does not corre-
spond to experience. We ordinarily suppose that we are acquainted with 
statically persistent selves; but what we actually encounter is a dynamic 
succession of perceptions in a state of “perpetual flux and movement” (T 
1.4.6.4; SBN, p. 252):
(2) AAABBBCCCDDDEEE
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Phenomenological consciousness does not reveal any mental states that are 
“constant and invariable” and that stand still over long stretches of time (T 
1.4.6.2; SBN, p. 252). Everyday belief in the perfect identity of selves, there-
fore, goes beyond the available evidence.
One might be tempted to respond that Hume is searching in the wrong 
place for a statically persistent self. We might not be able to discover any 
immutable pearls or kernels when surveying the fluctuating contents of 
experience. But perhaps it is the subject of these experiences which remains 
constant and invariable over time; it is the owner or bearer of these percep-
tions, in other words, which resists change.
Hume denies that we are phenomenologically aware of ourselves, how-
ever, as something that exists independently of perceptions. We are not 
acquainted with ourselves at any moment of time, according to Hume, let 
alone as temporally extended entities.
For my part, when I enter intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception. (T 1.4.6.3; SBN, p. 252).
The subject of experience is not something which appears in conscious 
awareness, in other words, as something over and above the features of 
perceptual states. There is, to put it succinctly, no “phenomenal I” (Prinz, 
2012).
Why do we ordinarily believe in statically persistent selves, then, if this 
commitment goes beyond the available evidence? Hume’s positive thesis in 
T 1.4.6 is that common beliefs about diachronic selves depend on biases and 
propensities of the imagination. We come to believe that selves are perfectly 
identical because the mind processes the changing sequences illustrated in 
(2) as smoothly and e!ortlessly as it does the constant and invariable series 
depicted in (1), and as result, we are naturally disposed to confound these 
di!erent patterns and inadvertently substitute one for the other in our 
“common way of thinking” (T 1.4.6.6; SBN, p. 254).3 Belief in statically 
persistent selves is illusory, then, in the sense that phenomenal experience is 
incorrectly interpreted by the mind. We are really only acquainted with 
a series of changing perceptions, but the imagination tricks us into viewing 
these contents “as if” they were constant and invariable (ibid.).
Careful reflection and philosophy teaches us, according to Hume, that 
perceptions are fluctuating rather than static. But it is psychologically 
impossible to completely shake or extirpate this illusion of the imagination.4
Our propensity to this mistake is so great . . . that we fall into it before we are aware, 
and tho’ we incessantly correct ourselves by reflection, and return to a more accurate 
method of thinking, yet we cannot long sustain our philosophy, or take o! this biass 
from the imagination (T 1.4.6.6.; SBN, p. 254).
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Philosophers continue to assent to the existence of fixed and immutable 
selves, therefore, while at the same time acknowledging these commitments 
to be empirically vacuous. Unable to abandon their natural beliefs in statically 
persistent selves, they turn to confabulation and invent palliative “fictions” in 
order to “justify” these implicit convictions (T 1.4.6.6; SBN, p. 254).
Philosophical belief in immutable diachronic selves is fictitious in the 
sense that it is an artificial creation whose sole purpose is to make us feel 
better. Philosophers do not posit these fixed entities in response to evidence 
or on the basis of reasons or arguments; rather, they do so because it enables 
them to avoid the uncomfortable collision between their intuitive and 
reflective beliefs. Unable to rationally justify their naïve commitment to 
statically persistent selves, they “feign” the existence of immortal souls or 
thinking substances in order to “disguise the variation” in their conscious 
experiences (T 1.4.6.6; SBN, p. 254).
Hume o!ers a similar account of belief in the synchronic existence of 
selves. We ordinarily suppose that selves, at one moment of time, are simple 
entities which lack constituent parts. But what we actually perceive are 
complex bundles of co-occurring qualities. Ontological commitment to 
atomic selves is once again based on a confusion of the imagination. 
A simple and indivisible entity “operates upon the imagination after much 
the same manner” as a collection of closely related parts (T 1.4.7.22; SBN, 
p. 263). We are unwittingly apt to conflate these similar sequences, there-
fore, and substitute one for the other in our thought. Philosophers who 
carefully reflect on the matter recognize that these attributions are mistaken, 
but are unable to loosen the grip of this illusion; in order to support their 
natural conviction that synchronic selves are simple and indivisible, they are 
disposed to “feign” an unperceived “center” which supplies the missing 
sense of unity (T 1.4.6.22; SBN, p. 263).
Hume does not dogmatically assert that philosophical beliefs about selves 
are erroneous in the sense that they fail to correspond to objective states of 
a!airs; rather, they are empirically false in that they fail to correspond to the 
available evidence. It is conceivable and thus epistemically possible that there 
are perfectly identical selves; there is nothing contradictory, as far as we can 
tell, about the notion of simple, indestructible, and unchanging self-kernels. 
But it is also possible that selves are momentary or short-lived entities. The 
crucial point is that the available evidence does not allow us to rationally 
decide between these alternatives. Common beliefs about personal identity 
are derived, then, from principles of imagination rather than reason.
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2. Hume’s experiments
Hume maintains that ordinary beliefs about personal identity are based on 
a fundamental attribution error: we are psychologically disposed to conflate 
fluctuating and invariant perceptions. Given that these mistaken ascriptions 
are based on natural tendencies of the mind, we would expect to find similar 
types of errors in our everyday thinking about persistence across a variety of 
object categories or domains. In order to test whether this is so, Hume 
conducts a series of experiments that survey our common attitudes about 
the diachronic identity of material objects, artifacts, and biological organ-
isms. The crucial question is whether we are prone to attribute perfect 
identity and static persistence to objects in each of these cases.
Hume’s first “experiment” asks us to consider masses of matter, such as 
rocks, that undergo a “very small or inconsiderable” addition or subtraction 
to their component parts (T 1.4.6.8; SBN, p. 255). This is a real alteration, 
even if a slight one. But Hume proposes that this is not how people would 
ordinarily respond to this vignette. We are psychologically disposed to 
ignore such negligible changes and attribute a constant and invariable 
existence to the rock. A bias of the imagination leads us to “scarce perceive” 
the transformation of its sensible qualities: we confound the observation of 
minor changes with the perception of something static and constant because 
the mind moves smoothly and easily over both types of sequences (T 1.4.6.8; 
SBN, p. 256).
This psychological explanation can be further “confirm’d”, according to 
Hume, by conducting a second experiment (T 1.4.6.10; SBN, p. 256). 
Consider a material object that undergoes major changes, but it does so in 
a gradual manner. Hume maintains that we would succumb to the illusion 
of viewing this object as if it were fixed and immutable. The imagination 
once again moves easily across these perceptual sequences and makes us feel 
as though we are perceiving a qualitatively constant and invariable 
(AAAAAAAAAA) entity. Indeed, we often make this mistake in everyday 
life: one fails to notice incremental changes in the height of children, for 
example, or the slow and steady erosion of rock formations.
Hume’s third experiment involves a case where small and gradual 
changes eventually lead to a radical transformation. He asks us to consider 
the famous case of Plutarch’s Ship of Theseus, whose wooden planks are 
successively repaired such that, over a period of many years, a considerable 
number of them have been replaced (the sailors presumably cannot replace 
planks that are submerged beneath the water). Hume maintains that we 
would intuitively judge that the ship remains qualitatively unchanged 
despite the fact that a majority of its parts have been altered. This erroneous 
attribution can only be explained, therefore, in terms of illusions of the 
imagination. Even though a large number of the planks are replaced over 
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time, their “purpose” remains exactly the same, and this fact is su"cient to 
induce the imagination to ascribe a fixed and immutable persistence to the 
ship (T 1.4.6.11; SBN, p. 257).
Hume’s fourth and final experiment involves biological organisms such 
as vegetables and animals. Suppose there is a young sapling that eventually 
grows into a mature oak tree. This is a case where the parts of an object are 
“totally replaced”: the older tree will not contain any of the material particles 
originally present in the sapling (T 1.4.6.12; SBN, p. 257). The formal 
qualities of the tree will also have been transformed: it is now much larger, 
for example, and has a notably di!erent shape. But we would nevertheless be 
inclined to believe, according to Hume, that the tree remains perfectly 
identical over time. This phenomenon can only be explained, therefore, in 
terms of biases and propensities of the imagination. The tree not only 
retains the same purpose or function over time, as is the case with the 
ship, but it does so because of the reciprocal interactions of each of its parts 
(T 1.4.6.12; SBN, p. 257). These causal relations prompt the imagination to 
feel an easy transition when surveying this changing object and confuse it 
with the perception of something that statically persists over time.5
Hume maintains that these four experiments demonstrate the explana-
tory power of his imagination-based account. His psychological explanation 
provides a unified account of our everyday intuitions about persistence. 
Indeed, Hume claims to have discovered a law-like generalization: in every 
instance where human beings observe a succession of closely related percep-
tions (AABBCCDDEE), they are disposed to make attributions of static 
persistence (AAAAAAAAAA). This pattern is robust across a wide range of 
cases. Hume cannot be fairly charged with o!ering an ad hoc explanation of 
everyday judgments of personal persistence, then, because his imagination- 
based hypothesis also covers ascriptions of diachronic identity to rocks, 
ships, vegetables and animals.
These experiments also serve a rhetorical function. One might be willing 
to accept that attributing perfect identity to mundane material objects 
involve fictions of the imagination. But one might be naturally inclined to 
refrain from endorsing this type of explanation with regard to something as 
privileged and cherished as ourselves. But Hume’s experiments take us in 
a step by step fashion from inanimate matter to sentient persons. This leaves 
his opponents with the burden of explaining the relevant di!erences 
between our everyday ascriptions of persistence across these domains.
This challenge has special force against soul theorists, such as Butler and 
Reid, who maintain that judgments of continued existence for persons are 
made on the basis of perfect or “strict” identity, whereas ascriptions of 
persistence for animals or vegetables are founded on imperfect identity 
and a “loose” and popular way of speaking (Butler, 2008, pp. 100–101; cf. 
Reid, 2008, pp. 111–112). Hume’s experiments reveal that one cannot draw 
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a categorical distinction along these lines. These persistence judgments are 
based on similar kinds of perceptual sequences, involve similar principles of 
the mind, and generate similar types of attributions. If talk of statically 
persistence in the case of biological organisms must be interpreted in a loose 
and popular sense, then we must adopt an equivalent stance with regard to 
the continued existence of selves.
3. Persistent objects: A cognitive science perspective
Hume approaches questions about personal identity as a scientist of human 
nature. We cannot properly understand what we ordinarily believe, or why 
we believe what we do, from the comforts of the philosophical armchair. 
Rather, we must carefully observe the types of attributions regularly made in 
common life and test rival hypotheses that purport to explain these facts.
There are serious concerns, however, about Hume’s experimental meth-
odology. Hume maintains that “we” are naturally inclined to make attribu-
tions of static persistence when presented with the four change vignettes (T 
1.4.6.7–1.4.6.12; SBN, pp. 254–257). But these assertions, by our current 
lights, are too speculative. In particular, Hume provides no empirical evi-
dence for the claim that our responses to these vignettes would be uniform 
in nature. He writes at one point that his proposals are based on “daily 
experience and observation (T 1.4.6.7; SBN, p. 255). But we are asked to take 
his word on this matter: he does not provide any records or data.
How would Hume’s account fare if tested in studies with large and 
diverse samples of respondents? Fortunately, cognitive scientists have 
devised novel techniques for rigorously studying ordinarily beliefs about 
persistence through change. This research allows us to evaluate the plausi-
bility of Hume’s proposals about the principles of mind that underwrite 
these commitments.
Consider Geo!rey Hall’s research, for example, on folk attributions of 
persistence. Hall presents participants in his experiments with sequences of 
photographs depicting novel objects – described either as artifacts or organ-
isms – whose parts are successively replaced over time. What he discovers is 
that respondents are significantly more likely to judge that these objects 
persist through change, even when there is a wholesale replacement of their 
parts, as long as these transformations occur gradually (Hall, 1998). It 
appears that Hume was on the right track in proposing, therefore, that 
our everyday attributions of persistence to artifacts and biological organisms 
does not require that that they contain any of their original parts; it su"ces 
that the new parts are introduced in an incremental fashion.
David Rose’s recent work in experimental philosophy also provides 
evidence in favor of Hume’s proposal concerning the conditions under 
which we ordinarily attribute persistence to objects that suddenly change. 
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Rose presents participants with a series of vignettes about material objects 
that undergo instantaneous alterations in their functional properties. Half of 
the participants are informed that the purpose of these objects is preserved; 
the other half are told that their function is transformed. Rose discovers that 
individuals in the ‘preserved function’ condition are significantly more 
likely to judge that the same object persists over time (Rose, 2015).6 
Hume’s conjecture has once again been corroborated: objects are believed 
to persist through sudden changes as long as they continue to perform the 
same functions.
Recent work in cognitive science also provides crucial support for 
Hume’s claim that everyday beliefs about diachronic persistence depend 
on psychological biases rather than rational insight or evidence. Hall main-
tains that attributions of persistence to objects composed of entirely new 
parts is a by-product of our natural tendency toward psychological essenti-
alism. We ordinarily think of whole objects as being greater than the sum of 
their parts, as he puts it, because we are inclined to believe that they have 
hidden natures or essences which make them the individual things they are 
(Hall, 1998). Children as young as age four “naturally assume” that objects 
contain essential cores that remain fixed and invariant over time (Medin & 
Ortony, 1989). This psychological “bias” induces us to think of these objects 
as having a “true nature” that remains “unchanged” even as their perceived 
characteristics are radically transformed (Gelman, 2004).
Psychological essentialism does not only underwrite our everyday beliefs 
about natural kinds, then, but it also manifests itself in how we think about 
the persistence of individual entities. Young children typically believe that 
the individual essences of animals remain fixed and invariant, for example, 
even when their observed behaviors and surface appearances undergo 
radical transformations (Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996). And mature adults 
display similar biases. Individual artifacts are frequently viewed as having 
underlying essences that constitute their identities and which make them 
preferable to perceptually indistinguishable duplicates (Hood, 2014; cf. 
Hood & Bloom, 2008). It is not only philosophers, therefore, who posit 
hidden and immutable cores. Human beings appear to have a natural 
propensity to suppose, without any evidence, that there are fixed essences 
that lie behind the manifold changes we perceive.
4. Persistent selves: A cognitive science perspective
Hume adopts an indirect strategy in defense of his hypothesis concerning 
the psychological mechanisms that are responsible for everyday beliefs 
about persistent selves. He takes himself to have securely established that 
attributions of persistence to vegetables and animals depends on biases and 
propensities of the imagination. We do not need to directly investigate 
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judgments of personal persistence, then, since we can make inferences on 
the basis of the “great analogy” between biological organisms and selves (T 
1.4.6.5; SBN, p. 253).
The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of a like 
kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, 
have a di!erent origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination 
upon like objects. (T 1.4.6.15, SBN, p. 259).
Hume assumes that there are no relevant di!erences in our beliefs about 
diachronic persistence across categories or domains. Once it has been 
demonstrated that our common attitudes about the persistence of plants 
and animals depends on psychological biases rather than rational insight, 
therefore, it can be safely concluded that the same is probably true of our 
everyday thinking about personal identity over time.
Recent work in cognitive science makes it clear that we can go one step 
further, however, and directly probe our lay intuitions about the persistence 
of persons. Consider the innovative studies, for example, designed by 
Newman et al. (2014). These researchers present participants in the 
United States with a series of cases about individuals who undergo radical 
changes in their beliefs and behaviors. Consider their vignette describing 
a father who is suddenly transformed into a responsible parent:
Al used to be a ‘deadbeat’ dad. In the past, he never showed any real a!ection for his 
children and never expressed any interest in his children’s lives. Now, however, Al is 
a very caring and involved father. (Newman et al., 2014)
Participants are subsequently presented with a forced choice task in which 
they are asked to decide whether these changes are caused by Al’s “true self” 
or “surface self”; they are also prompted to rate the extent to which this 
dramatic conversion is “true to the deepest, most essential aspects of [Al’s] 
being” (ibid.: p. 204).
What these researchers discover is that participants have a general ten-
dency to interpret Al’s transition to being a caring father in terms of the 
emergence of a “deeper, hidden element” in his personhood (ibid.). Al did 
not, in other words, really change. He was always a devoted father; he just 
did not act like one. Participants are inclined to believe that Al now acts in 
accordance with an essential or true self that was “always hidden deep 
inside” (Strohminger et al., 2017).
Folk judgments concerning personal persistence display another hallmark 
of essentialist reasoning: true selves are typically regarded as being immuta-
ble. When participants in experimental studies are queried about what they 
imagine their lives to be like in thirty years, for example, they have a strong 
tendency to report that their core selves will remain exactly the same (Christy 
et al., 2019). The same applies when participants are asked what their lives 
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would be like if, counterfactually, they had been born in a di!erent historical 
period: the experimental results indicate that people expect their true or 
essential selves to remain fixed and invariant across di!erent contexts.
Additional evidence in support of the proposal that diachronic identity is 
commonly understood in terms of immutable essences comes from research 
on the attitudes of the elderly toward persistence across lifetimes. Troll and 
Ska! (1997) conduct structured interviews with individuals (N = 150) aged 
85 or older. Members of this age group are most likely to have undergone 
major changes and upheavals, such as the loss of loved ones, hospitalization, 
or a sudden change of residence. But when those in this population are 
asked whether they have remained the same over the course of their whole 
lives, nearly three quarters of them respond that their core or true self has 
remained fixed. Even though many of these respondents believe that their 
personality traits and behaviors have varied over time, they did not interpret 
these alterations as providing any indication that their deeper or essential 
self has changed. As one 103-year old woman in their study put it: “My core 
has stayed the same. Everything else has changed.” (Troll & Ska!, 1997)
Cognitive science research provides prima facie support, then, for Hume’s 
claim that everyday belief in statically persistent selves is based on psychological 
biases rather than rational insight or evidence. Human beings have a natural 
tendency to understand the persistence of entities – whether they are material 
objects, artifacts, biological organisms, or persons – in terms of essential cores 
that somehow resist change. Indeed, contemporary researchers take their 
studies to indicate that our everyday beliefs about the self are based on fictions.
[T]he true self is, shall we say, evidence-insensitive . . . Yet people have little trouble 
imbuing it with a host of hidden properties . . . The true self is posited rather than 
observed. It is a hopeful phantasm . . . The notion that there are especially authentic 
parts of the self, and that these parts can remain cloaked from view indefinitely, 
borders on the superstitious. This is not to say that lay belief in a true self is 
dysfunctional . . . Perhaps it is a useful fiction . . . But, in our view, it is a fiction 
nonetheless. (Strohminger et al., 2017)
Belief in true or essential selves is fictional in the sense that it goes beyond 
the evidence. We have no reason or justification for supposing that there are 
unperceived cores deep within ourselves that remains fixed and immutable 
over time; we only arrive at these commitments because of a natural psy-
chological tendency to categorize the world in terms of hidden essences.
5. Persistent selves: Cross-cultural diversity
If everyday beliefs about personal persistence are based on domain-general 
principles such as psychological essentialism, one would expect these 
ontological commitments to be uniform around the globe. Julian De 
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Freitas and colleagues (De Freitas et al., 2017) investigate the question of 
whether belief in true selves is universal by presenting change vignettes – 
including the case of Al who is suddenly transformed into a caring and 
involved father – to members of four di!erent countries: one with a highly 
independent social orientation (United States) and three with more inter-
dependent orientations (Singapore, Colombia, and Russia). The study 
design remains exactly the same: participants are asked to choose whether 
the personal changes described in the vignettes are caused by true or 
superficial selves, and they are asked to rate the extent to which these 
alterations conform to the “deepest, most essential aspects” of these 
persons (De Freitas et al., 2017).
Their experimental results point to a “noticeable cultural di!erence” in 
the degree to which members from these di!erent groups adopt an essenti-
alist stance toward the self (ibid.: p. 18). Populations from Colombia and 
Singapore are forty percent less likely than populations in the United States, 
for example, to interpret the change vignettes in terms of hidden or true 
selves (ibid.: p. 17). These findings are consistent with other recent cross- 
cultural studies. Researchers have discovered that Japanese populations 
(with a more interdependent social orientation), for example, are signifi-
cantly less likely to believe in essential core selves than Australian popula-
tions (with a more independent social orientation) (Tsukamoto et al., 2015). 
Members of cultures with interdependent social orientations do not, in 
general, exhibit a strong tendency to construe the boundaries of selves as 
stable and fixed independently of context (cf. Kung et al., 2016; Varnum 
et al., 2010). Even if participants from the United States are disposed to 
postulate essential core selves, then, populations with di!erent cultural 
backgrounds do not reliably share these intuitions.
Similar cognitive disagreements have been found when comparing 
American and Tibetan populations. Shaun Nichols and his colleagues pre-
sent a large sample [N = 520] of lay persons from the United States and 
Tibet with survey questionnaires that probe their commitment to immuta-
ble core selves. They ask participants to rate the degree to which they agree 
(on a 1–7 Likert scale) with the following two statements about their “core 
self beliefs”:
[1] There is some essential core that is your self that stays exactly the same throughout 
your life.
[2] My core self will be exactly the same in a year as it is now. (Nichols et al., 2018)
The results of these surveys reveal significant disparities between these 
populations: lay Tibetans tend to reject the notion of core persisting selves, 
whereas their American counterparts on average put credence in it 
(ibid.: p. 7).
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Michael Chandler and his colleagues provide further evidence for cultural 
diversity in beliefs about the continued existence of selves. These researchers 
conduct “personal persistence” interviews with participants from both First 
Nations (Indigeneous) and culturally mainstream populations in Canada. 
They first present these informants with a series of fictional stories in which 
protagonists undergo major changes, such as the transformations under-
gone by Scrooge in A Christmas Carol or those of Jean Valgean in Les 
Miserables, and subsequently ask whether they believe that these characters 
remain one and the same from the beginning to the end of these stories and 
why they believe this is the case. They also ask participants about any 
personal changes they have experienced and investigate their justifications 
for believing in their own personal persistence, or lack thereof, across the 
duration of their lives.
What these researchers find is that a significant majority of those in the 
cultural mainstream interpret the persistence of these fictional characters, as 
well as their own selves, through the lens of an “unchanging entity or 
essential core” (Chandler & Proulx, 2008). There is a widespread tendency 
in this population to suppose, as these authors put it, that 
a “subterranean . . . unchanging core” remains static beneath these perceived 
changes (Chandler et al., 2003).7 But this essentialist stance is significantly 
less prevalent among First Nations youth; indeed, less than 20% of this 
population attribute these personal changes to the influence of hidden or 
immutable selves (Chandler & Proulx, 2008).8 Commitment to essential 
core selves is not global, then, but rather is shaped by local cultural factors.9
6. Narrative selves and useful !ctions
First Nations respondents do in fact typically believe that they remain 
numerically the same over long stretches of time. The crucial point is that 
they do not account for their continued existence by invoking any immu-
table pearls or hidden self-kernels. Rather, they have a strong tendency to 
justify their belief in personal persistence in terms of whole life stories. 
A majority (80%+) of the First Nations participants – and a minority (15– 
20%) of respondents from the cultural mainstream – maintain their sense of 
personal continuity via a “bridging narrative” that assimilates the various 
changes they experience into the structure and format of life stories 
(Chandler & Proulx, 2008; cf. Chandler et al., 2003).10
Research in cognitive science suggests that it is not unusual for people to 
view themselves as protagonists in ongoing life stories (D. P. McAdams & 
Adler, 2010; McAdams, 2006). If you ask a three-year old about what 
happened during the recent past, you are likely to receive a sequential list 
of remembered events. But the ability to represent important episodes of our 
lives in narrative format typically emerges during adolescence (Habermas & 
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Bluck, 2000). The rough outlines of these whole life stories are continually 
revised and edited, and eventually accepted or rejected, during our later 
adult years (McAdams, 2006).11
When we think of our lives in terms of whole life stories, the personal past 
is no longer portrayed as serial chronicles or historical annals. Conscious 
experience is successive; it is just one event after another. But narrative 
selves are not represented this way. Rather, plot lines are introduced; 
obstacles and challenges come into focus; a select group of characters are 
cast as heroes or villains; key past scenes are rendered as turning points 
(McAdams, 1996, pp. 311–312). Life stories are typically organized, more-
over, around general themes. Two themes are especially prevalent in the 
narratives articulated by adults in the United States. One prototypical theme 
involves “redemption sequences”, where painful events in the past are 
compensated by their contribution to an emotionally positive present; 
another recurrent motif involves “contamination sequences”, where the 
narrative arc bends in the opposite direction: pleasant scenes from the 
past are spoiled by current pain and su!ering (McAdams & McLean, 2013).
Life stories serve to smooth over, or bu!er, sudden biographical changes. 
When adolescents are queried, in interview settings, about disruptions in 
their lives, such as abrupt changes in personal relationships, they often feign 
or postulate narrative connections in order to help make sense of these 
transitions (Habermas & De Silveria, 2008). Indeed, one can observe a direct 
correlation between the quantity of perceived change and the number of 
narrative links woven into life stories (Habermas & Kober, 2015, p. 670). 
The story format provides structure to event sequences that are otherwise 
experienced as fragmentary or disjointed. As one leading researcher in the 
field of narrative psychology puts it, whole life stories help to construct 
a “patterned life out of what may appear, at first blush, to be a random and 
scattered life” (McAdams, 1996, p. 309).
Life stories are fictional in the sense that they are created in order to 
supply our lives with a greater sense of unity and coherence. This is not to 
say that people ordinarily regard these narratives as fictitious; they genuinely 
believe the stories they tell. And these life stories, except in exotic cases, are 
not pure fantasies. They are usually based on matters of fact whose veracity 
can be corroborated or contradicted by others (Bruner, 2004, p. 693). 
Nonetheless, these narratives are not objective life histories. And there are 
reasons to be suspicious about their reliability. One consideration lies with 
recent findings about the accuracy of autobiographical memories. Episodic 
memories are not videotapes that accurately reproduce previous events or 
states of a!airs; rather, these memories often reconstruct the past in light of 
our present concerns and future goals (D. P. McAdams & Adler, 2010, 
p. 40). People are often highly selective, moreover, in choosing the char-
acters, scenes, or themes that organize their life stories (Walker, 2012, 
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pp. 64–5). Finally, these narratives are often motivated: individuals with 
greater a!ective concern for the well-being of others, for example, are more 
likely to formulate their life stories according themes of redemption rather 
than contamination (McAdams & Guo, 2015, p. 479).
To the extent that narrative selves are fictitious, however, they appear to 
be useful fictions. Researchers have observed a strong correlation between 
life stories and psychological well-being. But it matters what type of story 
one tells. Individuals who formulate their narratives around themes of 
redemption, for example, are more likely to report higher levels of happi-
ness; going in the opposite direction, those who articulate dramatic changes 
in terms of contamination sequences are more likely to be depressed (cf. 
Adler et al., 2015; McAdams & Guo, 2015). Canadian adolescents who 
portray major turning points of their lives as having positive resolutions, 
moreover, report significantly higher levels of psychological well-being than 
those who do not (Tavernier & Willoughby, 2012). Finally, patients in 
psychotherapy who construe personal changes in terms of themes of 
agency – where they portray themselves as protagonists battling obstacles – 
tend to exhibit better mental health (Adler, 2012).
Belief in true or essential selves, it should be pointed out, also appears to 
be a convenient fiction. These commitments go beyond the available evi-
dence, but they have positive influences on subjective well-being. Recent 
empirical studies based on large samples of American populations [N = 299] 
have established, for example, that those who posit immutable hidden selves 
typically report higher levels of life-satisfaction than those who do not 
(Dulaney et. al., 2019; De Freitas et al., 2017). Essentialist and narrative 
tendencies should be seen as alternative psychological strategies, therefore, 
for resisting or defying personal change and providing individuals with 
a greater sense of unity and coherence in their lives. The essentialist strategy 
accomplishes this feat by positing a hidden substantial entity that remains 
immutable in an ontological realm independent of our successive percep-
tions. The narrative strategy performs this feat by accommodating personal 
changes, and connecting the diverse chapters of our lives, according to the 
representational format of whole life stories.
Failure to adopt either of these psychological heuristics can be hazardous. 
Consider once again the research on First Nations adolescents conducted by 
Chandler and colleagues. Members of this population typically interpret 
persistent selves in narrative terms. But whole life stories are harder to 
articulate for Indigeneous groups whose cultural traditions and oral his-
tories have been destroyed by colonization. The prevalence of suicide in 
these groups is disproportionately high. And this tragic situation appears to 
depend, to some extent, on their inability to tell coherent life stories. Eighty- 
percent of young adults in these high suicide-risk populations lack any 
psychological strategies for accounting for their personal persistence 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 1159
(Chandler & Proulx, 2008; cf. Chandler & Ball, 1990). These adolescents are 
no longer able to accommodate disruptions or imagine their futures; they 
su!er, as these researchers put it, a “loss of temporal connectedness” 
(Chandler & Proulx, 2008). Unable to tell their whole life stories, it seems, 
they are literally falling apart.
Research in cognitive science vindicates Galen Strawson’s descriptive 
claim that there are individual “variations . . . of temporal temperament” 
or “time-style[s]” (Strawson, 2004; cf., 2017, pp. 109–110). People do not 
universally experience their lives in story-like terms. But recent work also 
casts doubt on Strawson’s normative proposal that “episodic” individuals – 
who do not regard themselves as having a continued existence over long 
periods of time – are often just as happy as “diachronics” who see them-
selves as persistent persons (ibid: pp. 432–3). Empirical research suggests 
that the belief in personal persistence across our lives substantially increases 
psychological well-being. This is not to deny that Strawson or others are 
happy episodics; it is just to say that they might be lucky exceptions.
7. Conclusion: Natural belief in selves
According to Terence Penelhum’s influential interpretation, Hume’s 
account of personal identity is a muddle. Hume assumes that qualitative 
changes are incompatible with numerical identity over time. But this is an 
“elementary error” in conceptual analysis (Penelhum, 1955, p. 577). Just as 
a single tune is composed of a succession of di!erent notes, so one person 
consists of a series of alternating perceptions (ibid: p. 580). Personal persis-
tence does not, in other words, require static invariance. Hume’s skepticism 
about belief in persistent selves turns on an overly restrictive account of the 
conditions of diachronic identity.
Penelhum’s critique, however, misses its mark. Hume approaches ques-
tions of personal identity, as we have seen, as a scientist of human nature. 
His ambition is not to introduce or defend a standard for re-identifying 
persons over time. And he does not endorse the narrow criterion that selves 
are temporarily extended if and only if they remain completely frozen in 
time. It is the untutored layperson, according to Hume, who typically 
believes in statically persistent selves. Hume’s experimental project is to 
understand the principles of mind that are responsible for this widespread 
commitment.
Hume’s main proposal is that there is a close resemblance between how 
we ordinarily think about the persistence of selves and biological organisms. 
How well do this hypotheses fare when evaluated from a cognitive science 
perspective? To the extent that folk beliefs about persistent selves and 
biological organisms are driven by domain-general principles such as psy-
chological essentialism, Hume’s analogy appears quite strong. But to the 
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extent that these ordinary beliefs are products of a propensity to construe 
our lives in terms of whole life stories, this analogy appears weak. Beliefs 
about the persistence of biological organisms and selves, according to 
narrative psychologists, depend on fundamentally di!erent types of mental 
operations. We ordinarily regard the nature of external objects in 
a ‘paradigmatic’ mode of thought, as Jerome Bruner puts it, whereas we 
typically regard ourselves in a ‘narrative’ mode (Bruner, 1986, pp. 12–13).
Cognitive science research on essential and narrative selves provide 
a good deal of support for the Humean proposal that everyday attributions 
of personal persistence are based on biases and propensities of the imagina-
tion. The human mind has a natural tendency, as far as we can tell on the 
basis of experiments, to disguise the perpetual flux of conscious experience. 
This imaginative feat is accomplished by either postulating hidden and 
immutable entities that defy change (essentialist strategy) or it assimilating 
these changes into the format of whole life stories (narrative strategy). The 
gap between what we perceive and believe about ourselves is filled by 
fictional elements. It is not rational insight or evidence, therefore, that 
underlies our ordinary sense of unity over time.
It is not surprising that commitment to persistent selves, therefore, is 
extremely di"cult – if not impossible – to extirpate through explicit reason-
ing. Consider the research of Shaun Nichols and colleagues, once again, on 
Buddhists attitudes toward the diachronic persistence of selves. Monastic 
Buddhist monks are o"cially committed to a ‘no-self’ view, according to 
which selves are transient or punctual: they do not continue to exist from 
moment to moment, let alone across entire lifespans (Nichols et al., 2018, 
p. 9). But when these monks are queried about their attitudes toward death, 
they typically report feeling intense fear of personal annihilation (ibid: 
p. 10). Commitment to the persistence of selves appears “resistant” to 
philosophical arguments or spiritual exercises (ibid: p. 16). Just as the 
most ardent skeptic about induction cannot stop believing in floors as 
they step out of their beds, so too the most devout Buddhist monk or no- 
self theorist view cannot help but view themselves as persistent beings when 
they quit their meditations and return to everyday life.12 These are natural 
beliefs, in Humean terms, that come to us involuntarily, like breathing.
Notes
1. In what follows, I will use the following abbreviations for Hume’s works: A treatise of 
human nature (Hume, 2002) as T; and the Selby-Bigge edition of A treatise of human 
nature (Hume, 1978) as SBN.
2. We ordinarily believe that there are many aspects of the self that undergo transforma-
tion over time. Students entering university do not expect to leave, for example, with 
exactly the same set of beliefs and desires. What Hume is claiming is that there we 
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commonly believe there is an essential core to the self which stands apart from these 
perceived changes. These immutable pearls or kernels are supposed to remain frozen 
in time in much the same way that the 60 minutes logo spans the successive frames of 
the shows’ episodes.
3. Associative principles play a productive role in this conflation. We do not observe 
anything in the contents of consciousness that remains unchanged over time; but we 
do perceive close relations between these fluctuating perceptions. Some of these 
relations are causal: perceptions “mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify 
each other” (T 1.4.6.19; SBN p. 261). Some of these relations are based on resemblance: 
current memories and past perceptions are similar in terms of their representational 
content, after all, and di!er only in their phenomenal force and vivacity. It is the 
multiple associative connections between the various items in our perceptual 
sequences that induces the mind to move easily over these changing sequences 
(AABBCCDDEE) and mistakenly view them as if they are with constant and invari-
able sequences (AAAAAAAAA). These are the “uniting principles”, as Hume puts it 
of the mental world (T 1.4.6.16; SBN, p. 260).
4. This sleight of hand resembles the ventriloquist trick where it appears to the audience 
as though the words are coming straight out of the mouth of the dummy. We believe 
that we see something, in other words, which is not really perceived. It is helpful to 
compare this sleight of hand to the causal illusion produced by the imagination. We 
commonly suppose that we apprehend necessary connections between events, accord-
ing to Hume, even though we are only immediately acquainted with constant con-
junctions. The analogy with causal illusions is helpful in another way. Philosophers are 
aware that we are not perceptually acquainted with necessary connections. But it 
psychologically di"cult to shake this illusion of the imagination, and as a result, they 
inevitably search in vain for these connections in the object (T 1.4.3.9; SBN, p. 223).
5. It is not only the “vulgar” or folk who allow themselves to be governed by such “trivial 
principles of the imagination”; even an illustrious thinker such as Lord Shaftesbury, 
according to Hume, is vulnerable to this psychological bias (T 1.4.6.6.; SBN, p. 255). 
Shaftesbury recognizes that the material parts of biological organisms are continually 
replaced over time; in order to justify the belief that particular plants or animals 
statically persist through this succession of parts, therefore, he supposes that there is 
some underlying and hidden “uniting principle” that remains fixed and immutable 
beneath these perceived changes (T 1.4.6.6 n; SBN, p. 50).
6. The Rose experiments reveal that we naively think that the teleological ends of objects 
are intrinsic to their natures. We are naturally “promiscuous teleologists”, as Keleman 
and Rosset put it, with a natural tendency to interpret natural phenomena in terms of 
purposes (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009, p. 138). When this psychological tendency gets 
combined with psychological essentialism, it leads us to think about persistence of 
objects in terms of preserving functions.
7. Some culturally mainstream respondents regarded these transformations as a kind of 
metamorphosis, where a person gradually develops into their true or essential self in 
much the same way that a caterpillar realizes its potentiality while becoming 
a butterfly; others in this group thought of themselves in preformationist terms, 
where personal changes are understood in terms of the unfolding of a latent true 
self that was “already present.. from the very beginning” (Chandler et al., 2003, p. 33).
8. The Chandler and Proulx research demonstrates that the First Nations populations do 
not accommodate personal changes in terms of essential or true selves. This provides 
prima facie reason to deny they are ontologically commited to the existence of 
subterranean hidden selves. But it does not demonstratively prove that this is so. It 
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remains an open possibility that members of these Indigenous groups remain com-
mitted to hidden and immutable selves, even though they do not invoke these entities 
in their explanations of personal changes. I would like to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for bringing this point to my attention.
9. One might wonder how Hume’s claim about the natural foundations of belief in 
persistent persons can be reconciled with the claim that cultural factors play 
a crucial role in determing whether individuals or groups come to view them-
selves in narrativist or essentialist terms. Hume’s o"cial position is that human 
beings have a general propensity to believe that they persist over stretches of time; 
but cognitive research indicates that local conditions on the ground help deter-
mine the particular conceptions of persistence that emerge across di!erent socie-
ties. It should be noted that this position closely resembles Hume’s account of the 
natural foundations of morality, according to which human beings universally 
share the same set of fundamental principles, but di!erent beliefs and socio- 
economic conditions generate superficial diversity of moral codes across societies.
10. Some members of the First Nations population leaned toward episodic or picaresque 
type of narratives; these stories involve minimal connections; what holds their lives 
together is nothing but the “passing of time” (Chandler et al., 2003, p. 39). Other 
respondents adopted a fuller narrative account where they see themselves as author-
ing or interpreting their lives in terms of chapters in an ongoing story (ibid: pp. 40– 
42).
11. It should be noted that Lorenzo Greco and Tony Pitson o!er narrativist interpreta-
tions of Hume’s theory of personal identity in Books Two and Three of the Treatise. 
Greco maintains that the stories we tell ourselves about our moral agency play a role, 
according to Hume, in helping us see ourselves as a “cohesive whole” rather than 
a merely disconnected bundle (Greco, 2015, p. 708). It is not clear whether Greco is 
claiming that Hume in fact o!ers a narrativist account of personal persistence, or if he 
is claiming that this is what Hume should have said. Greco writes at one point, for 
example, that Hume’s account of the self “bears some strong similarities” to 
a narrative conception of selves (Greco, 2015, p. 700); elsewhere, he refers to the 
narrative account as “Humean” in spirit (ibid.: p. 707, cf. p. 711). Pitson is more 
explicit that he is “pursuing this claim on [Hume’s] behalf” (Pitson, 2002, p. 93).
12. Tibetan Buddhist Monks do not explicitly endorse an essentialist view of the self; 
they see persons, rather, as changing bundles of five aggregates. The fact that they 
fear personal annihilation entails that they are implicitly committed to their con-
tinued existence; but it does not entail, as Nichols and his colleagues suggest, that 
they adopt an essentialist attitude toward their core selves. There is an excluded 
alternative: a narrative approach to personal persistence. As Nichols and his collea-
gues point out, after all, autobiographies are a paradigmatic genre in Tibetan 
literature (Nichols et al., 2018, pp. 16–17). So the monastic Tibetans might make 
the supposition that persistent persons are composed of narratively connected 
bundles of perceptions.
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